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Abstract
Part I of this Essay sets out why the legal framework in the EU amplifies what are, in reality,
relatively small differences in thinking about resale price maintenance (”RPM”). This amplification is primarily due to the fact that the legal system asks economists, in the name of legal
certainty, to draw a false dichotomy between those agreement and practices that are harmful and
those that are beneficial. For practices like naked price-fixing, it is relatively easy for economists
to agree on an answer. It is harder, however, for practices like RPM, which can give rise to serious
anticompetitive harm, but can also prove to be indispensable for important and valuable benefits
to consumers. Part II therefore provides a summary of the economic literature on RPM and emphasizes the need for further empirical research in this area. Within the current legal framework,
there is not yet sufficient evidence to justify moving RPM out of the EU’s “presumed illegality”
or “object” box and into a case-by-case assessment of “effect” box. It is clear, however, that this
approach will sometimes presume that some RPM arrangements are illegal when in fact they either
do not restrict competition or, if they do, they are nevertheless justified by generating consumer
benefits. Accordingly, we would have significant reservations about a legal framework that goes
beyond “presumed illegality,” for example making RPM de facto illegal or even per se illegal, as
in the United States before Leegin. On the basis of these beliefs, Part III suggests several small
steps that can be taken towards assessing RPM within a “presumed illegality” framework without
sacrificing too much of the legal certainty that is realized under the current approach. First, we argue that it is important to ensure that any presumption of illegality is truly rebuttable, and provide
some thoughts as to how this might work. This includes the requirement that the authority should
set out at least one plausible “theory of harm” that is consistent with known facts. Second, we
suggest that a series of screens might usefully be adopted for considering whether there is likely
to be a credible theory of harm in any particular case of RPM, and for prioritizing cases on this
basis. Third we recognize that a prioritization approach may not be as effective in a system such
as the United States, where competition law is primarily enforced via cases brought by private litigants. There may, nevertheless, be some potential to use screens of this sort to help define a legal
standard. Under this approach, failure of the screens would demonstrate that there is no credible
theory of harm associated with a particular case of RPM and the presumption of illegality could
be rebutted. This approach would be similar to the screens that are commonly applied in the EU
in article 102 TFEU (”Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”) (article 82 EC (“Treaty
Establishing the European Community”)) abuse-of-dominance cases.
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ESSAYS
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: EXPLAINING
THE CONTROVERSY, AND SMALL STEPS
TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED POLICY
MATTHEW BENNETT, AMELIA FLETCHER,
EMANUELE GIOVANNETTI, & DAVID STALLIBRASS *
INTRODUCTION
Resale price maintenance (“RPM”) is the practice by which
a manufacturer directly sets the retail price for which a
downstream retailer can sell its goods.1 Over recent years, there
have been important divergences in thinking among economists
and lawyers about the appropriate treatment of RPM under
competition law. In the United States, these divergences were
brought into focus by the Leegin case,2 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that RPM should no longer be viewed as per se
illegal under domestic antitrust law.3 In the European Union
(“EU”), the debate was precipitated by the European
Commission’s (“Commission”) review of its vertical restraints
block exemption and guidance.4
* All the authors are economists at the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) Office of Fair
Trading (“OFT”). However, the views expressed in this Essay are their own and not
necessarily those of the OFT. Emanuele Giovannetti is also Associate Professor,
Department of Economic Sciences, University of Verona. This Essay was originally
presented at the 2009 Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law and Policy and the Essay is also published in INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW 2009, ch. 19 (Barry Hawk ed.,
2010).
1. This Essay uses the term resale price maintenance (“RPM”) to encompass both
fixed-price RPM (in which the manufacturer sets a specific retail price) and minimum
RPM (in which the manufacturer sets the minimum retail price but allows the retailer to
set prices above this); both are covered by the arguments made throughout. The Essay is
not intended to cover maximum RPM, which is typically viewed as unlikely to be
anticompetitive.
2. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
3. Id. at 907 (“Vertical price restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason.”).
4. See Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and
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Part I of this Essay sets out why the legal framework in the
EU amplifies what are, in reality, relatively small differences in
thinking about RPM. This amplification is primarily due to the
fact that the legal system asks economists, in the name of legal
certainty, to draw a false dichotomy between those agreements
and practices that are harmful and those that are beneficial. For
practices like naked price-fixing, it is relatively easy for
economists to agree on an answer. It is harder, however, for
practices like RPM, which can give rise to serious anticompetitive
harm, but can also prove to be indispensable for important and
valuable benefits to consumers.
Part II therefore provides a summary of the economic
literature on RPM and emphasizes the need for further empirical
research in this area. Within the current legal framework, there is
not yet sufficient evidence to justify moving RPM out of the EU’s
“presumed illegality” or “object” box and into a case-by-case
assessment or “effect” box. It is clear, however, that this approach
will sometimes presume that some RPM arrangements are illegal
when in fact they either do not restrict competition or, if they do,
they are nevertheless justified by generating consumer benefits.
Accordingly, we would have significant reservations about a legal
framework that goes beyond “presumed illegality,” for example
making RPM de facto illegal or even per se illegal, as in the
United States before Leegin.5
On the basis on these beliefs, Part III suggests several small
steps that can be taken towards assessing RPM within a
“presumed illegality” framework without sacrificing too much of
the legal certainty that is realized under the current approach.
First, we argue that it is important to ensure that any
presumption of illegality is truly rebuttable, and provide some
thoughts as to how this might work. This includes the

Concerted Practices, No. 330/2010, 2010 O.J. L 102/1 (reevaluating European Union
(“EU”) antitrust policy on vertical agreements); Commission Notice, 2010 O.J. C 130/1
(promulgating new guidelines on vertical restraints).
5. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911),
overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907. This rule was based on a restrictive reading of section
1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States.” Sherman Act § 1, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2006)).
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requirement that the authority should set out at least one
plausible “theory of harm” that is consistent with known facts.
Second, we suggest that a series of screens might usefully be
adopted for considering whether there is likely to be a credible
theory of harm in any particular case of RPM, and for prioritizing
cases on this basis. Third we recognize that a prioritization
approach may not be as effective in a system such as the United
States, where competition law is primarily enforced via cases
brought by private litigants. There may, nevertheless, be some
potential to use screens of this sort to help define a legal
standard. Under this approach, failure of the screens would
demonstrate that there is no credible theory of harm associated
with a particular case of RPM and the presumption of illegality
could be rebutted. This approach would be similar to the screens
that are commonly applied in the EU in article 102 TFEU
(“Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”) (article 82
EC (“Treaty Establishing the European Community”)) abuse-ofdominance cases.6
These steps require varying degrees of further work, with the
third being the most controversial and raising the most
significant issues. However, we believe they all hold the potential
to substantially ameliorate many current reservations, while
preserving legal clarity in a position where RPM will, for the most
part, remain unlawful. Such steps would also have the benefit of
avoiding cases—arguably, such as Leegin—where there is no clear
credible theory of harm and thus carry the potential to bring the
entire competition system into disrepute by making it appear out
of touch with reality.
I.

LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND: THE ROOT OF
DISAGREEMENT

From an economic standpoint, competition law ensures
competitive markets, which generate benefits for consumers and

6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 89 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 74–75
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
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drive productivity.7 As such, a key objective of any system of
competition law should be to prevent firms from engaging in
practices and signing agreements that appreciably prevent,
restrict, or distort competition, such that there is detriment to
consumers that is not counterbalanced by benefits to consumers.
The language of EU competition law on agreements, article
101 TFEU (article 81 EC), is in line with this economic thinking.
The first of the above principle corresponds precisely to article
101(1) TFEU, which prevents agreements or concerted practices
that “have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the internal market.”8 The
second aspect of the objective outlined above corresponds, more
approximately, to article 101(3) TFEU, which makes article
101(1) inapplicable where the agreement or practice in question
“contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
which does not . . . impose on the undertakings concerned
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of
those objectives.”9
Difficulties arise, however, in the practical application of
these provisions. On its face, the law seems to suggest the need to
review every agreement or practice on a case-by-case basis to
assess whether there is an anticompetitive object or effect and, if
so, then determine if the anticompetitive effect is
counterbalanced by the benefit to consumers. In practice
however, there is a need for far greater legal certainty than a
case-by-case analysis can provide.
The need for greater legal certainty is the result of two key
factors. First, a case-by-case approach places a high burden on
firms, who are not in position to carry out this sort of economic
7. E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 7 (2d ed. 1993); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8–22 (1976). See generally Joseph F.
Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological
Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987) (articulating the efficiency and productivity goals
of competition law).
8. TFEU, supra note6, art. 101(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 88. Notably, the pre-Lisbon
Treaty on Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”) used the phrase
“common market” instead of “internal market.” EC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 81(1), 2006
O.J. C 321 E, at 73 (emphasis added).
9. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 101(3)(a), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89.
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analysis for each and every agreement that they enter.
Consequently, there is a risk that firms will simply avoid engaging
in particular agreements or practices, even when they would be
beneficial. This would clearly be detrimental to both competition
and economic efficiency. Second, and conversely, a case-by-case
approach places a high burden on competition authorities and
private parties that bring antitrust actions, which could lead to
under-enforcement and therefore insufficient deterrence of
anticompetitive behavior. These concerns are especially acute for
less-mature regimes or smaller, under-resourced authorities.
Again, this would be detrimental to a competitive economy.
A. Creating Legal Certainty in the Law on Agreements
For the reasons outlined above, there have been moves—on
both sides of the Atlantic—to put certain types of agreement and
practice into particular “boxes,” removing the need for case-bycase analysis of the likely harmful effects of such practices.10 The
following figure sets out some of the most common “boxes” that
have been used, along a spectrum which runs from “definitely
illegal” to “definitely legal.”
effect
presumed lack presumed benefit per se
of effect (e.g.,
(e.g., block
legality
de minimis)
exemptions)
Figure 1. Linear representation of artificial “boxes” used by competition authorities to
assess agreements.
per se
illegality

object

10. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(sustaining RPM agreements as per se illegal under the Sherman Act in the United
States as a matter of law); T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van Bestuur van de
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, [2009] 5 C.M.L.R. 1701, 1737–38 (confirming that
harmful effects may be presumed in “object” cases in the EU because practices therein
“can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of
normal competition”). It is worth noting that even in object cases parties may adduce
evidence to meet the exemption criteria under article 101(3), even though the burden
of proof is on them to prove that the criteria are satisfied. Matra Hachette SA v.
Commission, Case T-17/93, [1994] E.C.R. II-595, 631, ¶ 104.
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“Per se illegality,” on the left hand side of the spectrum, is a
box used in the United States, but not in the EU.11 Under this
approach, there is no potential to rebut the presumption of
anticompetitive harm, nor to show that the agreement has
efficiency benefits that might counterbalance any harm. Pricefixing is the classic “per se illegal” agreement.12 Leegin focused on
whether RPM, which had historically also been “per se illegal,”13
should be taken out of this box.14
In the EU, the distinction is instead between “object” and
“effect” infringements. Practices that are anticompetitive by
“object” are presumed anticompetitive.15 For these cases, a
competition authority is not required to provide any real
economic (or other) evidence of likely anticompetitive harm. It is
sufficient to demonstrate that the practice fits into the “object”
box and hence is illegal. However, the “object” box differs from
the U.S. “per se illegality” box in two ways, at least conceptually.
First, the presumption of anticompetitive harm, while strong, is
nevertheless theoretically rebuttable if compelling evidence is
adduced that the agreement could not have been expected to
have an anticompetitive effect. Second, an object infringement
can still, in theory, be exempted from article 101(1) if it meets all
of the conditions under article 101(3).16 In reality, as will be
explained in Part III.A, the extent to which the “object” box
differs from “per se illegality” depends on the extent to which
competition authorities and courts are open to accepting
11. See Luc Peeperkorn, Resale Price Maintenance and Its Alleged Efficiencies, 4 EUR.
COMPETITION J. 201, 201-03 (2008) (contrasting the EU system of individualized
assessment and the U.S. per se approach). It bears note that per se treatment of RPM
was eventually overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Leegin. See supra note 3.
12. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007)
(endorsing a U.S. Court of Appeals holding that “[the Supreme] Court has consistently
applied the per se rule to [vertical minimum price-fixing] agreements”).
13. See supra note 5.
14. Id. (“We [the Supreme Court] granted certiorari to determine whether vertical
minimum resale price agreements should continue to be treated as per se unlawful.”).
15. Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. C 291/1, at 3 [hereinafter Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints] (“[I]n the case of restrictions by object . . . the Commission is not required
to assess the actual effects on the market.”).
16. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 101(3)(a), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89. Specifically, the
treaty requires that the agreement create efficiency benefits, that a fair share of these
benefits pass to consumers, that the restrictions are indispensable and that there is no
elimination of competition. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 01(3)(a), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89.
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rebuttal arguments under article 101(1) or efficiency arguments
under article 101(3). Should such arguments be dismissed
without due consideration, there would be little in practice to
differentiate the two approaches.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are a variety of
boxes under which an agreement or practice may be judged
(likely to be) legal. Some practices are simply “per se legal,” on
the basis of being viewed as unlikely to have an anticompetitive
object or effect. Other agreements and practices are considered
so unlikely to restrict competition appreciably that they are
classed in a “presumed lack of effect” box. The EU de minimis
doctrine is a good example.17 Likewise, for particular types of
agreement and particular market share thresholds, it can be
presumed that, even if there is anticompetitive harm, it is
counterbalanced by efficiency benefits.18 The various EU block
exemptions are good examples.19
These various boxes clearly have the potential to provide a
fair degree of legal certainty. The appropriate box, if any, for a
particular agreement or practice will effectively depend on how
likely it is that the agreement or practice in question would be
17. See Commission Notice, 1997 O.J. C 372/13 (defining the market thresholds
under which all non-object agreements are presumed lawful). Again, this de minimis
presumption can theoretically be rebutted. The current market share thresholds, which
relate to the aggregate market shares held by all of the participating undertakings, are
five percent for horizontal agreements and ten percent for vertical agreements. Id., 1997
O.J. C 372/13, at 14. Another good example is the European Commission’s
(“Commission”) guidance that buying groups are unlikely to be found unlawful if the
parties to the agreement have a combined market share of below fifteen percent on the
purchasing market(s) as well as a combined market share of below fifteen percent on
the selling market(s). See Commission Notice, 2001 O.J. C 3/2, at 19.
18. Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, No. 2790/1999, pmbl., 1999
O.J. L 336/21, at 21 (“Experience acquired to date makes it possible to define a category
of vertical agreements which can be regarded as normally satisfying the conditions laid
down in Article 81(3) [EC (article 101(3) TFEU)].”).
19. See Council Regulation on Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain
Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, No. 19/65/EEC, art. 1, 36 J.O. 533
(1965), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965–66, at 35 (enabling legislation providing authority to
declare certain categories of agreements as exempt under article 101(3) TFEU (article
81(3) EC) by regulation). It is worth noting that block exemptions provide more legal
certainty than a simple rebuttable presumption. If an agreement is covered by the
criteria in a block exemption, then the benefit of the block exemption has to be
explicitly removed before that agreement can be found unlawful. See Commission
Notice, 2000 O.J. C 291/1, at 17–18.
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found illegal if a careful, case-specific “effects” analysis were
carried out. For example, practices such as naked price-fixing are
regularly expected to be found illegal under a case-by-case
analysis and, therefore, it is appropriate to put such agreements
into the “object” (or even “per se illegality”) box. Practices such
as exclusive distribution by firms without significant market
power, on the other hand, are regularly expected to be found
legal under a case-by-case analysis because harm is either unlikely
or counter-balanced by efficiency benefits and, therefore, it is
appropriate to place such agreements into the “presumed lack of
effect” (or even “presumed benefit”) box.
Agreements that do not fall into any of these boxes continue
to require a full case-by-case “effects” analysis. The EU does
provide some further guidance, within its various guidelines, as
to the circumstances under which it might expect to find
particular agreements or practices lawful or unlawful.20 Beyond
this, however, there has been relatively little work done on
“screens” that might help firms or regulators in deciding
whether a particular agreement is lawful or unlawful under an
“effects” analysis.
B.

Comparison with Article 102 TFEU

It is interesting to contrast this situation with article 102
TFEU (article 82 EC),21 the EU law relating to abuse of a
dominant position. Under article 102, practices are not
compartmentalized into “boxes” in quite the same way as article
101. There is no general doctrine that certain conduct is by its
very nature regarded as being injurious to the proper
functioning of normal competition.22 Indeed, it could be argued
that all article 102 practices are assessed on an “‘effect’” basis.
However within this “‘effect’” category, the approach taken is
fairly nuanced. The courts and the Commission have, over time,
20. See Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. C 291/1, at 17–18.
21. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89; EC Treaty, supra note 6,
art. 82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 74–75.
22. See James S. Venit, Article 82: The Last Frontier—Fighting Fire with Fire?, 28
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1157, 1166–67 (2005) (“[W]hereas [a “box”] approach may be
justified by the express reference in Article 81 to the ‘object or effect,’ of a restrictive
agreement, there is no textual basis for such an approach under Article 82 which is why
the case law requires an analysis of effects.”).
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established “screens” that help determine both whether the
practice can be presumed pro- or anticompetitive, and what
proof is needed to change this presumption.23 For example, firms
have no duty to deal (that is, refusing to supply a new customer is
presumed a valid practice) unless there exist certain “exceptional
circumstances,” specifically that the product is indispensable for
competition, the refusal eliminates competition, and there is no
clear objective justification.24
Another contrast with article 102 is also worth discussing. In
theory, an agreement or practice which falls within the “effect”
box under article 101 is not presumed lawful or unlawful, absent
a full effects analysis. Nevertheless, it is, our opinion, based on
our experience of working at an enforcing agency, that practices
or agreements which fall into the “effect” box are often viewed as
roughly legal. At the very least, there seems to be an expectation
among firms that the competition authority or private plaintiff
will face an uphill struggle in proving why an agreement or
practice is likely to be anticompetitive under a full “effects”
analysis and should therefore be found illegal. If so, it would be
unsurprising for firms to make the calculated decision to accept
the risk of litigation and engage in the behavior.25
Under article 102, by contrast, there is certainly no
presumption that all behavior of dominant firms is roughly
23. See, e.g., Manufacture Française de Pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission,
Case T-203/01, [2003] E.C.R. II-4071, ¶ 56 (holding that loyalty rebates are
presumptively illegal); AZKO Chemie BV v. Commission, Case C-62/86, [1991] E.C.R. I3359, ¶ 71 (holding that predatory pricing is presumptively illegal when below average
variable costs).
24. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-7791. It is worth
noting that the Commission’s recent guidance on enforcement priorities under article
102 provides additional screens—in particular price-cost-based screens—which arguably
go beyond current case precedent. See Commission Communication, 2009 O.J. C 45/7.
However, these are, at least theoretically, intended to set enforcement priorities rather
than legal standards. See id., 2009 O.J. C 45/7.
25. In reality, the extent to which this last point concern is valid is linked to the
standard of proof required by courts in order to show anticompetitive effect. If this
standard of proof is set too high, then it will be more rational for firms to engage in
anticompetitive behavior, since the risk of effective litigation is low. This suggests less
difference between the “effect” box and “per se legality” than might have been
expected. Such a situation arguably in turn increases the pressure to put into the
“object” box agreements and practices which are fairly, but perhaps not very, likely to be
harmful.
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lawful, absent an examination of the “screens.” This perception
has been reinforced by the extremely high fines imposed by the
Commission in recent abuse cases.26
C. Implications for RPM
Based on the above, the key question from a legal
perspective is whether it is appropriate to put RPM in any of the
boxes above. To assess this, the core question would seem to be:
how often would RPM, if assessed on a case-by-case basis, be
found illegal (that is, anticompetitive and without countervailing
efficiency benefits)? If the answer is “usually” or “very often,”
then the approach described above suggests that RPM should fall
within the “object” box.
Unfortunately, economists dread this core question because
they find it exceptionally hard to answer. As discussed below, the
difficulty is that, from an economic perspective, RPM sits rather
awkwardly on the spectrum displayed in figure 1. There is no
doubt that it can be anticompetitive. But it can also give rise to
important consumer benefits and, in some cases, will be
indispensable for achieving those consumer benefits. Many
economists would agree that RPM is, if anything, slightly closer to
the left hand side of the above figure than the right hand side.27
But we believe that most economists would agree that it does not
squarely sit on the left hand side with naked price-fixing or bidrigging and, moreover, its precise position in any given case will
depend on market circumstances.
26. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/37.990, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n
May 13, 2009), cited in 2009 O.J. C 227/13 (Intel) (fining Intel €1.6 billion); Commission
Decision No. COMP/C-3/37.792, 2007 O.J. L 32/23, at 28 (Microsoft) (fining Microsoft
€497,196,304).
27. See Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Law and Economics of Resale Price
Maintenance, 13 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 57, 81–82 (1998) (“At the policy level, it is our
view, shared with others, that economic efficiency is best served if resale price
maintenance is judged according to a rule of reason or a per se legality standard.”); see
also Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints:
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391 (Paolo
Buccirossi ed., 2008) (“[V]ertical restraints in manufacturer/retailer settings are
publically desirable when privately desirable, and thus government intervention is not
warranted in those situations. This is not to say that the use of VR should never be
questioned, but the presumption should not be that they are detrimental to
consumers . . . .”).
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Faced with the alternatives that RPM is mostly harmful or
mostly beneficial, some economists (ourselves included) will
gravitate towards the left side of the spectrum and settle for RPM
to be an “object” infringement. Others cannot accept the fact
that this approach has the implication of presuming unlawful, on
the one hand, agreements that could not possibly have an
anticompetitive effect and, on the other hand, agreements that
have real efficiency benefits. These economists settle for RPM to
be an “effect” infringement.
What is interesting is that there is not necessarily a great
deal of difference between the views of these two sets of
economists. Rather, they are making different choices from what
seems—from an economic perspective—to be an unappetizing
menu of options. Relatively small differences in view are
therefore amplified by the legal framework with which
economists are presented.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF RPM
Part II looks further at the economics of RPM, including the
possible benefits from RPM, the possible theories of harm, and
why economists find the choice described above so difficult.
A. Efficiency Benefits of RPM
There is a large amount of literature on RPM,28 but the
literature on the efficiency benefits of RPM is, for the most part,
older and more well-established than that on its anticompetitive
effects. There are essentially three broad economic arguments in
support of RPM.
The first, which formed the basis of the submissions of the
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in the
Leegin case,29 is that while RPM reduces intra-brand price
competition, it can promote interbrand competition by

28. See generally, e.g., Emanuele Giovannetti and David Stallibrass, Three Cases in
Search of a Theory: Resale Price Maintenance in the UK, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 641 (2009)
(analyzing the anticompetitive effects of resale price maintenance); Peeperkorn, supra
note 11 (analyzing the efficiency effects of resale price maintenance).
29. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10–12,
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480).
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providing quality certification30 or reducing free riding at the
distribution level on aspects such as service provision.31 The idea
here is straightforward: Where retailers carry out some form of
service on behalf of manufacturers that involves the retailers
incurring a cost, there is a risk, absent RPM, that retailers whom
do not provide the service could cut prices and win business away
from retailers that do. A typical concern might be a customer
spending time in the testing room of a high-end shop,
comparing a variety of speakers, and then buying the speakers
elsewhere from the cheapest outlet. If this occurs, then clearly
the retailers’ incentives to provide these services will be reduced,
which is bad for both the manufacturer and consumers.32
The second argument relates to the “indispensability”
question involved in assessing efficiency benefits under article
101(3) TFEU (article 81(3) EC).33 While other vertical restraints
can achieve some of the same benefits as RPM, there will be
circumstances (for example, the presence of risk aversion) in
which RPM is more effective than these other restraints. An
intuitive example might be a supplier of a branded product who
primarily sells through a specialist bricks-and-mortar retail
network that is approached by an internet retailer. The supplier
is concerned that if he supplies the internet retailer, absent RPM,
then the internet retailer could price low and damage the
30. See Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and
Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 358 (1984).
31. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON.
86, 104 (1960).
32. See Peeperkorn, supra note 11, at 208 (explaining the claim that resale price
maintenance reduces free riding by distributors). The quality certification literature is
essentially the same, but the “service” that the retailer provides is a form of “quality
certification” service. See Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 30, at 347 (proposing a model
in which a retailer provides a service by “ascertaining the quality or stylishness of
commodities” for the consumer). When a reputable retailer stocks a given product they
implicitly guarantee the quality of that product in the eyes of consumers. By way of
example, a department store that stocks a particular perfume raises the brand profile of
that perfume. There is a cost involved in running a department store, however, so if all
customers just go and buy the perfume more inexpensively elsewhere, the department
store will not be able to survive. This will in turn not only remove a valued outlet for
customers but also an important quality certification mechanism for suppliers. In
practice, of course, the department store is more likely simply to refuse to stock any
perfume for which this is likely to happen.
33. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 101(3)(a), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89; EC Treaty, supra
note 6, art. 81(3)(a), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 74.
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viability of the bricks-and-mortar network. The supplier can
either (1) refuse to supply the internet retailer, by excluding the
retailer from his (legal) selective distribution system, or (2) agree
to supply him on an RPM basis. If, as here, the alternative to RPM
is not to supply at all, then RPM may in fact be the more efficient
and procompetitive option.
The third argument is based on the standard Chicago
school argument that, in any given market, there is only one
monopoly profit.34 An upstream monopolist has no ability to
increase its profits through RPM, since it should in any case be
able to extract the full monopoly market rent through its
wholesale pricing structure (at least so long as nonlinear pricing
is possible). As such, the argument runs, RPM cannot be welfarereducing and, if it is undertaken, should be assumed beneficial.35
B.

Anticompetitive Effects of RPM

While the literature setting out procompetitive rationales for
RPM has existed for some time, the anticompetitive literature is
relatively more recent and still developing. Part II.B classifies the
literature under five general theories of harm.36
The first theory of harm relates to RPM as a facilitating
practice to sustain upstream collusion, which relates to interbrand competition. When upstream firms wish to collude, and
concomitantly negotiate contracts with wholesalers or retailers in
34. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A
Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (2008). For more information about
the interface of Chicago-school economics and antitrust law, see generally POSNER, supra
note 7.
35. See, e.g., Thomas M. Melsheimer, Economics and Ideology: Antitrust in the 1980s, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1319, 1330–31 (1990) (“[M]any vertical restrictions, such as resale price
maintenance, might have efficiency-enhancing, procompetitive effects.”). It should be
highlighted that the elimination of double marginalization is not a good argument for
the imposition of RPM, since it is in fact solved by maximum RPM, which is typically
legal. See Roger D. Blair & Francis Lafontaine, Analysis of Maximum Resale Price
Maintenance, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 25, 25 (1999) (“For all intents and purposes,
[Supreme Court precedent] permits maximum resale price restraints.”) (citing State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)); Benjamin Klein, Distribution Restrictions Operate by
Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the Use of Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, 7
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 48 (1999) (stating that a manufacturer may use maximum resale
price maintenance to control double marginalization).
36. Each of these effects is robust to the Chicago critique described above. See supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
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private, it can be difficult for any collusive agreement to be
monitored; rival wholesale prices cannot be monitored and
enforced, and retail prices are an imperfect proxy. Jullien and
Rey have shown that, in this context, upstream firms can use
RPM as a facilitating practice for collusion since it brings the
publicly observable element of price under their control.37
The second theory of harm relates to RPM as a facilitating
practice to sustain downstream collusion. This can occur where
downstream firms wish to engage in collusion. They can use the
imposition of multiple RPM agreements by an upstream firm
(acting as a “common agent”) to facilitate downstream price
collusion. The enforcement of RPM can facilitate agreement on
prices, monitoring of prices, and even punishment for breaching
the collusive agreement. In some instances, the RPM is effectively
no more than a “sham” vertical agreement, masking a purely
horizontal agreement.38
The third theory of harm relates to the use of RPM as a
commitment device to protect upstream monopoly rents. This
relates to a well-known monopoly commitment problem,
originally identified by Hart and Tirole.39 A monopolist
maximizes its profit by selling the right to distribute to only one
downstream player. However, ex post it has an incentive to break
this agreement and sell to additional downstream players. The
overall effect is that, absent a commitment device, the upstream
firm is unable to extract the full rent associated with its market
power, because it cannot commit itself to not cutting prices on
later contracts. RPM can solve this problem, by allowing the
37. Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion, 38 RAND J.
ECON. 983, 996 (2007).
38. See, e.g., Argos Ltd. v. Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1318, [141],
[2006] U.K.C.L.R. 1135 (Eng.) (holding that “if (i) retailer A discloses to supplier B its
future pricing intentions in circumstances where A may be taken to intend that B will
make use of that information to influence market conditions by passing that
information to other retailers (of whom C is or may be one), (ii) B does, in fact, pass
that information to C in circumstances where C may be taken to know the circumstances
in which the information was disclosed by A to B and (iii) C does, in fact, use the
information in determining its own future pricing intentions, then A, B and C are all to
be regarded as parties to a concerted practice having as its object the restriction or
distortion of competition.”).
39. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure,
1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 205, 208 (describing the monopoly
commitment problem in a Cournot setting).
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upstream firm to commit to the monopoly price and extract its
full monopoly rents. This theory has also been shown under
different assumptions by O’Brien and Shaffer,40 and Rey and
Vergé.41
The fourth theory of harm relates to the use of RPM as a
means either to soften downstream competition or deter
downstream entry. Shaffer has shown that downstream firms may
have a unilateral incentive to ask the upstream firm to implement
RPM as a means to soften competition between themselves.42
More generally, RPM can benefit downstream firms by making it
harder for cut-price entrants to steal business by undercutting
competitors. Such entrants can still make additional profits
through greater efficiencies, but they cannot use these
efficiencies to steal business through lower prices.43
The final theory relates to the use of RPM as a means to
dampen system competition through networks of interlocking
RPM agreements. The simplest example would be a market
where there is a duopoly of manufacturers upstream and a
duopoly of retailers downstream and both retailers carry the
products of both manufacturers—a situation defined as “double
common agency.” Dobson and Waterson have shown that in a
bargaining framework, RPM can reduce retailers’ incentives to
negotiate on wholesale prices by preventing downstream
undercutting.44 This, in turn, dampens upstream competition

40. Daniel P. O’Brien & Greg Shaffer, Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts,
23 RAND J. ECON. 299, 305–06 (1992) (discussing resale price maintenance and the
commitment problem in a differentiated product market).
41. Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts, 35 RAND J.
ECON. 728, 740 (2004) (confirming the findings of O’Brien and Shaffer).
42. Greg Shaffer, Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of
Facilitating Practices, 22 RAND J. ECON. 120, 130 (1991) (describing the potential benefits
of resale price maintenance to a downstream firm).
43. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT UPON
PRODUCTIVITY OF ENDING RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE ON BOOKS (2008) (U.K.),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft981.pdf; Stephen
Davies et al., The Benefits from Competition: Some Illustrative UK Cases 31–46 (Dep’t of
Trade and Indus. Economic Paper No. 9, 2004) (U.K.) (describing the impact of resale
price maintenance in the British book market).
44. Paul W. Dobson & Michael Waterson, The Competition Effect of Industry-Wide
Vertical Price Fixing in Bilateral Oligopoly, 25 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 935, 953–54 (2007) (“In
the present context, firms facing the prospect of intense retail rivalry destroying profits
for all industry members will have a joint interest in avoiding such destructive
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and creates higher retail prices, to the detriment of consumers.45
More generally, Rey and Vergé have shown that RPM can
potentially eliminate “any effective competition—at the
interbrand level as well as at the intrabrand level—and yield
instead the monopoly outcome” if used jointly with franchise
fees.46
C. The Dreaded Question: How Often is RPM Likely to be Harmful on
Balance?
Given that there is the potential for both anticompetitive
harm and efficiency benefits from RPM, which of these is most
likely to be dominant? Put another way, how likely are these
theories of harm, and how significant are the efficiencies likely to
be?
It is worth noting that there is not particularly strong
empirical literature regarding RPM. Lafontaine and Slade
provide the most recent summary of the existing empirical
evidence on RPM.47 Within a broader analysis of vertical
restraints, they identify three empirical research papers looking
at RPM.48 One of these papers examined cases where RPM was
imposed by government,49 while two of them examined cases in
which RPM was imposed by firms.50 Lafontaine and Slade
conclude that self-imposed RPM cases have an overall positive
competition. An industry-wide move to RPM or exclusivity would be a way of avoiding
this outcome when it allows for higher combined profits.”).
45. Id. at 954 (“[RPM] would be against consumer interests. A move to RPM would
maintain the same level of variety in the market, but lead to higher prices.”).
46. Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, Resale Price Maintenance and Horizontal Cartel 4
(Ctr. for Mkt. & Pub. Org. Working Paper No. 02/047, 2004).
47. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints:
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391 (Paolo
Buccirossi ed., 2008).
48. Id. at 406 tbl.10.2, 407 tbl.10.3 (citing Thomas W. Gilligan, The Competitive
Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 17 RAND J. ECON. 544 (1986); Pauline M. Ippolito &
Thomas R. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: An Economic Assessment of the Federal
Trade Commission’s Case Against the Corning Glass Works, 39 J.L. & ECON. 285 (1996);
Stanley I. Ornstein & Dominique M. Hanssens, Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing
or Restricting? The Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1987)).
49. Id. 407 tbl.10.3 (classifying Ornstein and Hanssen’s study as an “[e]mpirical
assessment of effects of mandated vertical restraints”) (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 406 tbl.10.2 (classifying both Gilligan’s and Ippolito and Overstreet’s
studies as “[e]mpirical assessment[s] of effects of voluntary vertical restraints”)
(emphasis added).
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impact, while the exogenously imposed ones have a negative
impact.51 However, the authors themselves caution against
drawing strong policy conclusions given the limited quantity and
quality of the empirical work.52
An examination of actual cases can be misleading, too, since
these cases are selected by the competition authorities. That said,
the U.K. Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) has intervened against
RPM on a number of occasions, and in each case the evidence
supported the view that the RPM in question was anticompetitive
and not outweighed by efficiency benefits. For example, two
recent OFT infringement decisions were closely interlinked with
theories of coordination, although it was not always explicitly
stated within the decision.53
On the benefit side, the OFT commissioned research on the
impact of the removal of RPM in the retail book market, which
was previously regulated by the “Net Book Agreement.”54 This
agreement, which was in place from 1901 until 1997, allowed
publishers to set the retail prices of books.55 In 1962, when the
agreement was given legal sanction under the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act,56 many efficiency arguments were made as to how
removal of this longstanding agreement would damage the
market for books.57 The agreement was disbanded in 1995,
51. Id. at 408.
52. Id. at 407–08 (discussing the limitations of the data examined).
53. See Decision of the Office of Fair Trading, Price Fixing of Replica Football Kit,
No. CA98/06/2003 (August 1, 2003), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
ca98_public_register/decisions/replicakits.pdf [hereinafter Replica Football Kit];
Decision of the Office of Fair Trading, Agreements between Hasbro U.K. Litd., Argos
Ltd. and Littlewoods Ltd. Fixing the Price of Hasbro Toys and Games, No.
CA98/8/2003 (November 21, 2003), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
ca98_public_register/decisions/hasbro3.pdf [hereinafter Hasbro]. For a discussion of
these two cases, see Giovannetti & Stallibrass, supra note 28, at 649–52.
54. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 43.
55. See Davies et al., supra note 43, at 31 (“[The Net Book Agreement] was used to
artificially constrain the retail price of book [sic], by preventing any bookseller from
selling a book under the publisher’s chosen (net) price, without facing a publisher-wide
refusal to supply future books.”); Sharon Billington, Note, Relief from Online Used Book
Sales During New Book Launches, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497, 520 n.139 (2006) (noting
the duration of the Net Book Agreement).
56. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68.
57. See Davies et al., supra note 43, at 32 (“In 1962 the Restrictive Practices Court
considered the illegality of the NBA [Net Book Agreement], and contrary to initial
intuition, its judgement [sic] exempted the NBA, allowing it to continue. In the
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following pressure from the competition authorities.58 In
practice, and contrary to expectations, the research found that
total sales volumes for books increased, as did the number of
titles published.59 There was also a significant increase in retail
diversity, with the growth of new retail formats facilitated by their
ability to offer discounted books.60 The U.K. situation also
compared positively with Germany, where RPM was maintained.61
On balance, it is far from obvious which way the scales tip on
RPM. As the academic literature acknowledges, the body of
research is simply not large enough to suggest strong conclusions
either way. More empirical evidence would be invaluable.62
However, on the basis of the evidence available to date, and if we
had to make a binary choice between object and effect, we
believe that there is simply not enough evidence to conclude that
RPM should be moved from the “object” category into the
“effect” box. Two main factors tip us towards this view.
The first is the role of RPM in facilitating coordination, a
role that other vertical restraints do not seem to have. We believe
this is not just a minor theoretical point, as illustrated by the
recent OFT infringement cases described above.63
The second factor is the fact that many of the benefits
provided by RPM may also, at least in theory, be secured by other
vertical restraints. While there are some cases (for example, risk
aversion) in which RPM may be more efficient than other types
of restraints, it is unclear how frequently these situations occur in
practice.

judegment [sic], Mr. Justice Buckley famously emphasized that ‘Books are different’,
and considered the NBA to be in society’s interest.”)
58. See id. at 32 (“Eventually, the pressures became too strong and the Publishers’
Association disbanded the NBA, making it effectively inoperable for publishers, in
September 1995.”).
59. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 43, at 42 figs.6.1–6.2 (showing the increase
in the volume of books sold in the U.K. from 1995–2006 and showing the increase in the
number of titles published in the U.K. from 1990–2005, respectively).
60. Id. at 43 tbl.6.1 (showing the rise of grocery stores, mail-order suppliers, and
the Internet at the expense of independent bookstores).
61. See id. at 76–89 (comparing the results from Germany and the United
Kingdom).
62. See Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 47, at 409 (“[M]uch more empirical
evidence is needed before we can draw more definitive conclusions . . . .”).
63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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III. SMALL STEPS TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED POLICY?
Given the legal framework described in Part I, we on
balance support the retention of RPM within the “object” box.
However, the preceding discussion illustrates some reservations
about a legal framework that, in the name of legal certainty,
presumes as illegal agreements and practices that either do not
restrict competition or that would nevertheless be justified by the
efficiency benefits they may generate. This issue is particularly
relevant to the case of RPM.
Part III sets out a few small steps that might be taken towards
a slightly more nuanced approach to assessing RPM. These would
substantially ameliorate our current reservations, while
preserving a position where RPM will, for the most part, remain
unlawful.
A. Ensuring that the Presumption of Illegality is Truly Rebuttable
Our first proposal towards a more nuanced approach is
relatively straightforward and uncontentious: widen the gap
between the EU “object” box and the U.S. “per se illegality” box.
Under the former, there is potential for parties to rebut a
presumption of illegality, and we believe that the potential for
rebuttal should be given more serious consideration, either
because there is no possible restriction of competition (that is,
no infringement under article 101(1) TFEU) or because there
are countervailing consumer benefits (that is, exemption under
article 101(3) TFEU).64
In order to facilitate rebuttal where appropriate, we would
also argue that the authority should set out one or more
“theories of harm.” These would not need to be “proven”—this
64. TFEU, supra note6, art. 101(1), 101(3), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 88–89. In this light,
we are pleased to note that there have been changes proposed to European Commission
regulations that stress the importance of efficiency arguments in the context of article
101(3). See, e.g., Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements
and Concerted Practices, No. 330/2010, pmbl., 2010 O.J. L 102/1 (acknowledging that
“[v]ertical agreements of the category defined in this Regulation can improve economic
efficiency within a chain of production or distribution by facilitating better coordination
between the participating undertakings; in particular, they can lead to a reduction in the
transaction and distribution costs of the parties and to an optimization of their sales and
investment levels.”).
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change should not be seen as moving to the “effect” box via the
back door—but merely “plausible.” That is, they would need to
be consistent with the facts, including the market circumstances
in which RPM had been applied.
In order to preserve legal certainty, we would propose that
the hurdle for rebuttal should be fairly high. For example, it
would not be enough for a party to state that “the authority has
not proven that this instance of RPM was likely to have a harmful
effect.” Rather, the burden would be on the party to demonstrate
that “this instance of RPM could not possibly have been expected
to have a harmful effect, as evidenced by the fact that the
authority cannot come up with a theory of harm which is
consistent with the known facts.”
B.

Use of Screens for Prioritizing RPM Cases

The second step we propose is a series of screens to consider
whether there is likely to be a credible theory of harm in any
particular case of RPM, and to prioritize cases on this basis.
Returning to the earlier discussion of the existing economic
literature in this area, we have attempted to identify three
relatively simple screens, at least one of which would need to
hold in order for there to be the possibility of a credible theory
of harm associated with the RPM:
First, is there unilateral market power or concentration
upstream? Without upstream market power there is unlikely to
be a theory of harm associated with protecting that market
power, nor is there likely to be a strong theory of facilitating
upstream coordination if the upstream market is fragmented.
Second, is there significant downstream buyer power or
concentration? If there is no downstream buyer power or
concentration, then there is unlikely to be a strong theory of
harm regarding RPM facilitating downstream coordination or
deliberately foreclosing downstream entry. We note that this
screen could be further strengthened by evidence that the
manufacturer, rather than the retailer, instigated the RPM.
Third, and finally, are there networks of RPM agreements
involving a number of upstream suppliers who account for a
significant share of the upstream market? If not, there is unlikely
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to be a theory of harm regarding RPM as a vehicle for facilitating
upstream market coordination.
If none of these three elements hold in a particular case,
there is unlikely to be a credible theory of harm, and therefore
the case would not be prioritized.
We recognize that there is room for further study in this
area. For example, how exactly does one define concentration?
Indeed, a more definitive view on screens may require further
developments in the economic literature. Nevertheless, we see
real potential for the use of screens by competition authorities
for purposes of case prioritization.
C. Use of Screens Within a Legal Standard
The final step discussed in this section is perhaps more
controversial, but we think it is nevertheless worthy of further
consideration.
While the use of screens for prioritization of RPM cases may
have a positive impact in the EU, we recognize that a
prioritization approach may not be effective in a system such as
the United States, where competition law is primarily enforced
via cases initiated by private litigants. However, screens may also
carry over in helping to define a legal standard. Under this
approach, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that at least
one of the screens was satisfied before the court would take the
case. Failing every screen could demonstrate that there is no
credible theory of harm associated with a particular case of RPM
and, in such circumstances RPM would be viewed as legal.
We believe that this approach would still leave most
potential cases of RPM illegal and preserve legal clarity, but it
would avoid cases—such as Leegin (arguably)—that lack a
credible theory of harm, and have the potential to bring the
competition system into disrepute by making it appear out of
touch with reality.
There are, however, some noteworthy disadvantages to this
approach. Some would no doubt argue that blurring the lines of
“object” infringement will prevent firms from assessing
themselves, smaller retailers from standing up to powerful
suppliers attempting to impose RPM, and authorities from
bringing cases, with the net result being a system that
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inappropriately resembles a standard “effects” analysis. For us,
however, a more compelling concern is that the screens outlined
above not only relate to the practices and position of the parties
involved in a particular RPM agreement, but it also relates to the
concentration in the relevant market and whether there is a
network of similar RPM agreements across the entire market. If
this approach prevents firms from credibly assessing the legality
of their own RPM without knowing (possibly secret) information
about its competitors, then it may prove unworkable.
Nevertheless, we think a system of screens is worthy of
further research and study. Moreover, it would have similarities
to the sorts of screens that are commonly applied in the EU when
assessing abuse of dominance cases under article 102 of the
TFEU.65
CONCLUSION
Within the current legal framework, there is not yet
sufficient evidence available to justify moving RPM out of the
“presumed illegality” or “object” box and into a case-by-case
“effect” box. However, it is clear that RPM falls far short of more
extreme anticompetitive behavior such as naked horizontal pricefixing. In an ideal world, the law would reflect this difference,
and Part III of this Essay sets out some small steps towards a
slightly more nuanced approach to assessing RPM. While further
work is required before these could be fully implemented, we
believe that these small changes could significantly reduce our
reservations about the current treatment of RPM, but preserve a
legal regime in which RPM will, for the most part, remain
unlawful.

65. See TFEU, supra note 6, art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89.

